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IN THE SUPREI1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo--DAVID R. WILLIN~S, dba
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HYRUM GIBBONS & SONS CO.,
a Utah corporation,

Supreme Court No. 16,024

Defendant-Respondent,
and
:e!ORTH UTAH COMHUNITY T.V. ,
a Utah corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent.
---oooOooo--BRIEF OF APPELLANT

*************
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to condemn one-tenth of an
acre of unimproved real property in the Logan foothills
for use as a radio-telephone transmitting and receiving
base station to provide mobile telephone and paging
service to the general public in the Logan area.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court held that appellant had the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
statutory Library
power
ofandeminent
domain,by the
but
denied
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Technology Act, administered
Utah State
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appellant's right to have the particular site
condemned for the reason that there might be some
radio wave interference from appellant's equipment
if it were improperly tuned on some occasions.
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant requests this Court to
reverse the trial court and hold that Plaintiff is
entitled to have the site selected herein comdemned and
that technical ~atters of radio wave consideration be
deferred to the Federal Communications Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in numbered paragraphs
to aid in referencing.

1.

Appellant, a Utah public utility, furnishes

radio-telephone service to the general public in
eleven

Utah counties, and has furnished such radio

common carrier regular and emergency services in Utah
since 1965.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; Tr. pp. 7, lines

15-16, 23-24;

9, lines 11-25; 10, lines 1-9;

2-10; 54, lines 16-25; 55,

2.

22,

lines

lines 1-22; 95, lines 4-23.)

Appellant's radio-telephone channels and

equipment operation are authorized and regulated by
the Federal Comn1unications Comn1ission, and appellant's
service is regulated by the Utah Public Service

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Plaintiff's Ex. 2, 3; Transcript,

pp. 9, lines 11-22; 20, lines 14-25; 21, lines 1-23.)
3.

In 1975 the Utah Public Service Commission

authorized appellant to furnish radio common carrier
telephone service in the Logan, Utah, area because
of public need there.
4.

(Plaintiff's Ex. 2.)

To provide "reasonable, adequate, efficient

and continuous service" in the Logan area, as required
by the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity order,
appellant must obtain an appropriate site, one-tenth
acre in size on which to locate a radio-telephone base
station and antenna that interconnects with the Bell
system.

The site must be at an adequate elevation

and in close proximity to the service area for the
authorized low wattage radio signals to penetrate the
major buildings in the service area, such as the Logan
Hospital where physicians will receive emergency and
business radio communications.

(Plaintiff's Ex. 2;

Transcript pp. 11-17; 31; 201, lines 6-25.)
5.

In selecting the Logan base station and

antenna site, appellant's engineers studied
extensively the terrain and topography of the Logan
area, calculating distances and elevations, physically
inspecting possible sites and examining existing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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structures in the service area.

They tested structures

in other service areas similar to the Logan structures
for signal penetration, using the same equipment to be
installed and operated in Logan.

(Transcript pp. 17,

lines 2-10; 24, lines 14-25; 25-26; 27, lines 1-ll;
28, lines 22-25; 33; 34, lines l-5; 49; 93, lines
13-25; 94-95; 110; lll, lines 14-25; 112-113; 126,
lines 3-25; 127; 128, lines l-8; 129-140; 146-148.)
They also tested

Sl;~al

compatibility and possible

interference for all other radio and television systems

in Logan with similar signals in other service areas.
(Transcript, pp. 18-20; 97; 101; 206, lines 2-25;
351, lines 4-10.)

Appellant made an economic

feasibility study of the Logan service area in making
a site selection.

(Transcript, pp. 22; 24; 32; 41;

108.)
6.

After making and repeatedly checking the

testing and analysis described above over a period
of several months, appellant was able to select only
one site which could meet the coverage and penetration
requirements for adequate service to the Logan area,
which is the site in dispute herein.

(Transcript,

pp. 32, lines 4-6; 35, lines 2-6; 43, lines 10-18;
44, lines l-7; 46, lines 9-19; 50, lines 9-25; 51-54;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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63, lines 1-17; 99, lines 13-16; 110-111; 146, line 3;
153, lines 3-8; 207, lines 2-15; 354, lines 1-11.)
The site is vacant property and is adjacent to existing
antennas and power poles larger than the one proposed
by appellant, and is accessible to necessary electric
power, telephone lines, and is on an existing road.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 9, 10; Transcript pp. 183, 10-14;
207, lines 8-15; Defendants' Exhibit 1.)
7.

After the completion of evaluation and

testing, appellant contacted respondent Gibbons,
the owner of the site, and intervenor Community TV,
who owns the adjacent antenna site.

Intervenor

initially had no objections to the proposed use of the
site by appellant, and appellant began negotiations to
purchase the same from Respondent.
pp.

(Transcript,

35, lines 7-25; 36; 37, lines 1-15; 38, lines

20-25; 39; 40, lines 1-6; 98, lines 12-25; 99, lines
1-12.)

Respondent thereafter declined to sell the

property because appellant and respondent could not
agree on the value, and appellant began condemnation
proceedings.
8.

After the action was commenced, intervenor

changed its position and was allowed to be a party,
and objected to the condemnation.
9.

(Record, p. 59.)

The trial court determined that appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 6 had the statutory power of eminent domain (Record,
pp. 38-40, 57-58, 129.), but denied appellant's right
to have the particular site condemned for the reason
that there might be some radio wave interference from
appellant's equipment if the same were improperly
tuned

on some occasions.

condemnation had been met.

All other conditions for
(Record, pp. 128-133.)

ARGUl1ENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT RIGHTLY DETERMINED
THAT APPELLANT AS A PUBLIC UTILITY HAD THE
RIGHT TO EXERCISE El1IHENT DOMAIN BUT WRONGLY
DEtliED APPELLA."<T' S RIGHT TO OBTAIN CONDEMNATION OF THE PARTICULAR SITE.
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- 7 The concept of wireless telephone companies
has been recognized for some time by Utah statutes.
Nonetheless, it may be helpful to review the background
legal provisions.
Appellant is a public utility and has acted in
this matter pursuant to a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity granted by the Utah Public Service Commission.
The telephone services provided by appellant, and to be
installed in the Logan City area, are subject to both the
Utah Public Service Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, as indicated by a prior decision
in this Court.

Williams v. Public Service Commission of

Utah, 29 Utah 2d 9 (1972).

As such, appellant is required

to provide the best possible service to the public in
the most economical and efficient manner.

Id.

The Legislature has defined those activities
which are public utilities and subject to the Utah Public
Service Commission in

§

54-4-25, Utah Code Ann.

among which is "telephone corporation."
corporation" is defined in
Ann.

(1953), as

§

(1953),

"Telephone

54-2-1(22), Utah Code

every corporation and person,

owning, controlling, operating or maintaining any
telephone line for public service within this state."
(Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

8 -

A telephone line is defined in§ 54-2-1(21) as:
. . . all conduits, ducts, poles, wires,
cable, instruments and appliances, and all
other real estate and fixtures and personal
property owned, controlled, operated or
managed in connection with or to facilitate
communication by telephone whether such
communication is had with or without the
use of transmission wires.
(Emphasis added.)
The authority of the Public Service Commission and
the definition of "public utility" is in § 54-2-1(29):
The term "public utility" includes every
. telephone corporation,
where the
serv:;_ce :;__o performed for .
. the public
genera~~"
. And whenever any .
telephone corporation .
. performs a service
for . . . the public, . . . for which any
compensation or payment whatsoever is received,
such .
. telephone corporation . . . is
hereby declared to be a public utility, subject
to the jurisdiction and regulation of the
commission and to the provisions of this title.
This court has defined the test for public
utility, in Medic-Call, Inc.
Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273

v. Public Service

(1970), citing 73 C.J.S.,

Public Utilities, § 7b, as follows:
Accordingly, a utility must act toward
all members of the public impartially, and
treat all alike; and it cannot arbitrarily
select the persons for whom it will perform
its service or furnish its commodity, or
refuse to one a favor or privilege which it
has extended to another, since the term
"public utility" precludes the idea of
service which is private in its nature and
is not to be obtained by the public.
Accord,
Holmgren
v. Funding
Utah-Idaho
Sugar
Co.,
(1978).
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
for digitization provided
by the
Institute --P.2d-of Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
issued to appellant herein (Record,pp. 4-6) authorizes
appellant to "acquire, maintain and operate facilities
for a radio-telephone and paging common carrier public
utility and to engage in the business of a common
carrier."

The order further states that such service

shall be "between fixed control and base stations
subject to the license requirements of the Federal
Communications Commission."

(Record, p. 6.)

In

addition, appellant is required to file his tariff
of rates similar to the tariff in effect for the
Salt Lake City, Provo, and Ogden areas, and appellant
is required to "at all times render reasonable,
adequate, efficient and continuous service in accordance
with the certificate hereby issued
p.

(Record,

6.)

In order to provide mobile telephone and
paging service, appellant must locate and obtain a
suitable site for a base station, which consists of
a paging transmitter and mobile telephone transmitter
and receiver, and an antenna.

The equipment to be

installed in Logan is a duplicate of equipment
operating at eleven other base stations along the
Wasatch Front and in eastern Utah, near Vernal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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- 10 (Transcript p. 13, lines 7-11.)

The proposed

frequencies for Logan would be the same used in
the other service areas, expanding the service
coverage for all other areas to include the Logan
area, so that a Logan physician would receive a
page signal while attending a function at the
University Medical Center in Salt Lake City from
a local telephone call in Logan, or an Ogden
contractor~~-~~

mobile

telephor.~

r9ceive telephone calls to his
ac

3

job site in the Logan area.

(Transcript, p. 13, lines 12-13; 357, lines 7-25;
358, lines 1-17.)
Without the base station site and equipment,
appellant would be unable to offer his service to
the public in the Cache Valley area, and it is
appellant's opinion that there is not an economically
feasible alternative site in Logan, other than the
site sought herein, and that the particular site is
absolutely necessary for appellant's responsibility
under appellant's Certificate.

(Transcript, p.

35,

lines 2-6.)
Under the provisions of § 78-34-4, Utah Code
Ann.

(1953), appellant meets the requirements therein:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1)
That the use to which it is to be applied
is a use authorized by law;
(2)

That the taking is necessary to such use; and

(3)
If already appropriated to some public use,
that the public use to which it is to be applied
is a more necessary public use.
The uses for which the right of eminent domain
may be exercised are listed in § 78-34-1, Utah Code
Ann.

(1953), and include:
(8)
Telegraph, telephone, electric light
and electric power lines, and sites for
electric light and power plants.
The trial court herein determined from the evidence

that the telephone service provided by appellant is
within the meaning of "telephone" as defined in
Title 54, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), and that the

appellant has the power of eminent domain under
Title 78, Chapter 34, Utah Code Ann.
p.

(1953).

(Record,

57.)
The use to which the property herein is to

be applied is a use which has been authorized by the
Utah Public Service Commission after consideration
of public need, pursuant to the previously cited
states.

The taking of a base station site in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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furtherance of the communications services provided
by appellant is necessary to meet such public need.
In a proper case, the Courts may consider whether the
particular taking is necessary as in Salt Lake
County v. Ramoselli, ---P.2d--- (Utah, 1977).
In the instant case, however, the Utah Public
Service Conr:J::_s,o_=, :;as ;::reviously determined
the particular publlc need in Logan, and appellant
has taken all the steps and made the necessary
decision to put the service into operation as
authorized.
The general rule regarding selection of the
property

to be taken is stated in 29A C.J.S. Eminent

Domain §90 as follows:
The particular property sought to be
condemned by the grantee of the power of
eminent domain must be necessary for the proposed project, but its decision as to the
necessity will not be disturbed by the
courts, at least in the absence of fraud,
bad faith, or abuse of discretion.
Accord, Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975)
(cited in §90).
The rule is also stated in 1 Nichols on Eminent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services and
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Domain,Library
§ 4.11
asTechnology
follows:
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 13 The overwhelming weight of authority makes
clear beyond any possibility of doubt that the
question of the necessity or expediency of a
taking in eminent domain lies within the
discretion of the legislature and is not a
proper subject of judicial review.
In accordance with the general principle,
it has been held that the courts may not inquire
into the question
{l) whether there is any necessity for the
taking,
(2) whether there is any need for resorting
to eminent domain in effecting such acquisitions,
(3)

whether the time is a fitting one,

(4)
whether there is a need for the property
to the extent sought to be acquired, . .
{5)
whether there is any need for the
particular estate sought to be condemned,

The Utah case of Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon
S.L.R. Co., 23 Utah 474, 484 (1901) states:
. . It may be said to be a general rule that,
unless a corporation exercising the power of
eninent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty
of oppression, its discretion in the selection
of land will not be interferred with. With the
degree of necessity or the extent which the
property will advance the public purpose, the
courts have nothing to do. When the use is public,
the necessity or expediency of appropriating any
particular property is not a subject of judicial
cognizance.
(Citations omitted.)
The trial court erred in finding (Record, p. 130,
Findings of Fact No. 7) that there were several other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 14 alternative sites that would perform the service
offered by appellant.

The clear evidence presented

by appellant was there it was economically unfeasible
to provide service in the Logan area from more than
one base site, and that to locate several transmitters
in the area to effect the same coverage and penetration
as the one site could give would make the cost of
such service prohibitive.
A.
Weil, the primary consideration, of
course, ls cost to the public.
We cannot
feasibly develop a site so expensive that
the public themselves cannot afford to use the
paging service or the mobile or portable
[telephone] service we have to offer.
(Transcript, p. 22, lines 2-6, testimony of
plaintiff.)

Q.
If that site were not available, Mr.
Williams, what alternative would there be, if any?
A.
Well, the site became unavailable to us,
I think the first thing we'd have to do is
reappraise whether reliable paging service could
be given to the people of Logan.
Q.
And if that were possible how would
that be done?
A.

Well, the first thing --

Q.

Barring economic considerations.

A.
Well, technically what we'd have to do
is probably install a number of transmitters,
one I'd say to cover the city, another to
cover portions of the surrounding area, and
posslbly as many as three transmitters would be
necessary.
But the problem with this is the fact

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 15 that with more transmitters and more repeater
sites and more control equipment for that
increases the price to the customer.
I would
estimate it would cost between two and three
times the amount of money that we are presently
offering or would offer the service for.
(Transcript, pp. 40-41, Questions by Mr. Lloyd,
Answers by plaintiff.)

Q.
Do you know of any alternate sites that
would be economically feasible for your company
to put in in the Logan area?
A.
No, I do not.
(Transcript, p. 99, lines 13-16, Questions by
Mr. Lloyd, Answers by Byron Colton, manager
for appellant.)

Q.
Well, then why do you claim that this is the
only acceptable site?
A.
That location right there is the only one that
does an adequate job of serving the community.
(Transcript, p. 146, lines 1-4, Questions by
Mr. Harris , Answers by Charles L. Johnson,
appellant's chief engineer.)
The appellant having established the need for
the site, it was error for the trial court to admit
speculation by witnesses that there could be satisfactory alternative single sites, or for the court to
find that ecomonically there could be satisfactory alternative multiple sites.

Not one witness produced by

defendant or intervenor had any experience in the equipment or
operation of a radio

common carrier system presently
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- 16 operated by appellant at numerous locations in Utah.
Not one witness produced by defendant or intervenor
had performed any kind of objective test using the type and
caliber of equipment appellant operates in Utah.
There was no evidence that appellant's system ever
caused or is causing any actual radio-wave
interference in the operation of extensive
transmitting equipment base stations throughout
the most populous areas of Utah.
PO HIT II.
INTERVENOR HAS NO STANDING TO
CONTEST THE COMPLAINT OF APPELLANT.
The trial court erroneously permitted intervenor
to enter this action.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7

(1953)

provides:
All persons in occupation of, or having
or claiming an interest in, any of the property
described in the complaint, or in the damages
for the taking thereof, though not named, may
appear, plead and defend, each in respect to
his own property or interest, or that claimed
by him, in the same manner as if named in the
complaint.
Intervenor North Utah Community TV has no
interest or estate in the property described in the
complaint.

It does have a large antenna approximately

100 feet from the property sought for condemnation,
and owns real property some 400 feet to the west and
200 feet to the north of the site.

(Defendant's Ex. 1;
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- 17 Transcript, p. 306, lines 15-23.)
This Court has refused to allow owners of
adjoining property to intervene in condemnation
actions without showing that the intervenor had
a vested interest in the property being condemned.
In State v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955),
an owner of adjoining property filed a claim that
his land would suffer damages if the land in question
were condemned.

This Court stated that the intervenor

could prevail only if the facts clearly established
that it had a "present, direct and real interest"
in the land sought to be condemned by the state.
In Tedesco both land owners planned to develop
subdivisions and had agreed that there would be
restrictive covenants on the land.
Similarly, other jurisdictions have disallowed
claims of adjoining property owners for intangible harm
alleged to be caused by the establishment of the
public use.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 163.

For

example, in City of Louisville v. Munro, 475 S.W.2d
479 (Ky. 1971), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that automobile noise and the mere presence of a
municipal zoo next door was insufficient to establish
any claim for damages, in the absence of showing
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material interference with the ordinary physical comfort
or reasonable use of the complaining neighbor's property.
That court further stated that it was not aware of any
case in which recovery was allowed where the alleged
taking, injury or interference did not have physical
aspects.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO
CONTEST CONDEMNATION ON BEHALF OF POSSIBLE
FUTURE RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORS.
The trial court erroneously found that
the use of the particular site by appellant raises
the likelihood that its installation would
seriously interfere with television sets within
the proposed subdivision within a distance of one-half
mile.

Defendant urged the trial court to deny the

appellant's right to use the property herein on the
grounds that it may interfere in future lot sales
on the remainder of defendant's property.
The clear testimony was that appellant operates
within high density residential locations in other
Utah locations without any interference of any kind.
No complaint has ever been lodged against appellant
with the governing authorities, the Utah Public Service
Commission or the Federal Communications commission.
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- 19 Transcript, pp. 19, lines 20-25; 20, lines 1-5, 19-23;
59, lines 14-25; 60, lines 1-7; 71, lines 22-23; 73, lines
7-9; 205.)

All testimony introduced on this question

of future residential interference by defendant was
speculation on the part of experts in general radio
experience who had no experience with any of appellant's
equipment.

(Transcript, pp. 231-232; 285-286.)

The trial court's finding regarding future
possible interference ignored defendant's own witnesses
who described commercial radio broadcasting antennas
within the City of Logan broadcasting daily within
the residential areas at thousands of watts of effective
radiated power, whereas appellant is limited to 500
watts, effective radiated power.

(Transcript, p.

269, lines 22-25; 274, lines 10-23.)
POINT III. APPROVAL OF SITE LOCATIONS AND
QUESTIONS OF INTERFERENCE BETWEEN COMMON
CARRIERS AND OTHER REGULATED RADIO CARRIERS
IS SOLELY WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE F.C.C.
The trial court denied appellant's right to
condemn the particular site herein solely on the
possibility of future radio wave interference with
intervenor's system and televisions in future
residential areas near the site herein, finding
that there were alternative sites which would not
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- 20 run any risk of interference with other public use
facilities.

(Findings of Fact 9, 10, Record p. 130.)

This determination of the trial court was
outside of its authority, as the question of radio
wave use and interference is entirely pre-empted by
federal law.

The fundamental rationale for the

Federal communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
et seq., is based on the fact that the number of
available radio frequencies is finite, and therefore,
Congress must exercise its power over interstate
commerce to allocate available frequencies and control
their use.

Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders

Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
Unquestionably, federal legislation has pre-empted
local regulation of radio transmission, including
assignment of frequencies, interference phenomena, and
the content of broadcast material.

Allen B. Dumont

Laboratories Inc. v. Carroll, 86 F. Supp. 813, aff'd,
184 F.2d 153, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929; United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).

Cited

in Schroeder v. Municipal Ct of Los Cerritos, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 87 (Cal. App. 1977).
It is stated in Schroeder, supra, at 88:
By contrast, many detailed regulations govern
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- 21 of interference phenomena (see e.g., 47 C.P.R.
§§ 97.73, 97.131, 97.133), and there can be no
doubt that federal regulation has pre-empted
control in those areas.
The power of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) over radio common carriers, including appellant,
and over cable television systems, including intervenor,
is plenary insofar as assignment of frequencies and
interference questions is concerned.

Such power includes

approval or disapproval of base station site locations.
Appellant may not construct the site here in question
without FCC approval in the form of a construction permit.
Included in the FCC's determination is whether there are
frequency or interference questions between appellant
and other broadcasters or users, including intervenor.
Such power over appellant is stated in American Tel. & Tel.,
Co. v. F. C. C., 572 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1978):
The FCC has a duty to "execute and enforce
the provisions of" the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 151.
The Communications Act
requires that common carriers furnish service
on reasonable request, 47 U.S.C. § 20l(a);
that rates and practices be just, fair, reasonaole
and nondiscriminatory, 47 U.S.C. §§ 20l(b), 202(a);
that carriers file their tariffs with the FCC,
47 U.S.C. § 203(a); that the FCC investigate
complaints, 47 U.S.C. § 208; that carriers
obtain certificates of public convenience and
necessity before constructing, acquiring or
operating any facilities or ter~inating any
services, 47 U.S.C. § 214; that the FCC examine
transactions that might affect rates or services,
47 U.S.C. § 215; and that carriers submit
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- 22 applications for proposed consolidations and
mergers to the FCC, 47 U.S.C. § 222. We are
aware of no authority for the proposition
that the FCC may abdicate its responsibility
to perform these duties and ensure that these
statutory standards are met.
Both appellant and intervenor are closely
regulated by the regulations adopted by the FCC.
Intervenor's technical operation is governed by parts
76 and 78, 47 C.F.R., for cable
operations.

television, CATV

Detailed technical regulations concerning

CATV ampli::'-'-cat.c':r: and interference are located at
47 C.F.R.

§§

76.601 et seq. (1977).

Appellant is

likewise subject to strict regulation as regards
improper tuning and quality of equipment to prevent
any interference with existing or projected conunercial
or residential receivers, as provided in 47 C.F.R.
§§

21.500 et seq.

(1977).

There were sharp differences in the testimony
adduced at the trial in this matter regarding whether
there would be any interference generated from
appellant's site.

Appellant objected to the speculative

testimony of intervenor and defendant's witnesses as
to possible interference concerns, particularly where
such witnesses had no experience in radio conunon
carrier equipment or operations.

It is appellant's

position that, absent some showing of interference from
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- 23 the numerous base station sites in Utah in operation for
many years throughout the major metropolitan areas in
Utah and closer in proximity to many commercial receivers
similar to the cable television receiver operated by
intervenor, that the issue of interference is reserved
solely to the FCC which has the expertise to make such
determinations, and which, by law, has primary jurisdiction
over such questions of location of transmitting equipment,
the specifications of such equipment, and the assignment
of operating frequencies.
The inappropriateness of the trial court's attempting
to evaluate the technical testimony reserved by law to
the FCC is illustrated in the court's comments during
the course of the trial:
I have no expertise at all in this field,
and I have to depend on what you people are
telling me about it.
(Tr. p. 254, lines 1-2.)

I do want to review the notes that I've
taken because I do have certainly some
consternation, as one of the counsel put it,
in connection with the facts that have been
put before this court, and I certainly think
in a field like this that the only thing I
know about communications, I either turn on
a knob or lift up a receiver, and that's
about it.
So it does certainly cause me some
problems in analyzing it, and I'll give my
attention to it and get it to you as soon as
I can.
(Tr. p. 372, lines 15-24.)
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The testimony from intervenor was contradicted
as to whether there was a real question of any
interference.

h'hen appellant first located the site

in question, he met with the President of defendant,
the owner of the property, to discuss purchasing the
property for the use indicated herein.

Mr. Gibbons

indicated he would sell the property if the
Community TV people had no objection.
Kent

The CATV engineer,

Gardner, c1er-. came to the site with appellant,

appellant's manager,

and Mr. Gibbons.

After describing

the proposed use, antenna and frequencies, Mr. Gardner
stated he could see no objection to the use of the
site.

(Tr. Pp. 35, lines 7-25; 36-39; 40, lines 1-6;

98, lines 12-25; 99,

lines 1-12.)

Mr. Gardner

testified for intervenor on other matters, but did
not deny the prior admission.

(Tr. 308-314.)

The Court permitted an opinion by Boyd
Humphries, a witness for intervenor who had no
experience with appellant's proposed equipment,
as to the probability of interference from appellant's
base station transmissions to the Channel 6 of the
CATV system, which he estimated to be 8 to 10 on a
scale of 10, with 10 being the highest probability,
over appellant's objection.
p. 321, lines 1-5.)

(Tr. p. 320, lines 4-25,

When pressed on cross examination,
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- 25 as to how far a theoretical interfering signal would
be able to travel from appellant's transmitter, Mr.
Humphries could not answer what signal strength a
theoretical interfering signal would have based upon
the specifications of the proposed equipment because
he did not know what the quality of the antenna would
be, and he admitted that it was common practice to
solve such a theoretical problem with inexpensive
filters.

(Tr. p. 325, lines 6-25; 326; and 327, lines

1-14.)
In contradiction of intervenor's speculative
testimony, appellant's engineers described other
broadcasting sites in Utah, using identical equipment
with that proposed for Logan, transmitting continuously
within several feet of receivers having the same
receiving function as the CATV antenna in Logan,
with no interference.

(Tr. pp. 18, lines 12-25;

19; 97, lines 18-25; 98, lines 1-11; 67, lines 8-25;
68, 1-11.)

In addition, appellant's electronics

engineers continuously monitor transmission equipment
for spurious or harmonic emissions.
occurred.
8-25; 206.)

None have

(Tr. pp. 204, lines 6-19, 23-25; 205, lines
Further, if, after tests are run with

the actual equipment, an unexpected interference
problem arises on a frequency, uncorrected by adjustments, an
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- 26 alternative frequency could be obtained from the FCC.
(Tr. p. 328.)
Appellant testified extensively concerning the
tools available to insure that the transmitting
equipment does not disturb any other equipment in the
area, including shielding the antenna, filtering the
equipment, and carefully analysing the signals
generated as the system is placed into operation for
s~ur~c_s

ern1ssions or harmonic distortions which are

not supposed to be present with the caliber of
equipment used by appellant.

Both witnesses for

intervenor and defendant admitted that such techniques
are available and common.
6-11.

(Tr. pp. 328; 338, lines

Tr. pp. 340, lines 15-25; 341-345.)
The recitation of the conflicts in the testimony

and the degree of technical evidence admitted by the
court demonstrates the wisdom of Congress investing
in the FCC, as a technical administrative agency, the
exclusive jurisdiction over interference and frequency
assignment.

Federal control over technical matters

such as frequency allocation to radio stations is
exclusive.

Head v. New Mexico Bd of Examiners in

Optometry,

374 U.S. 424,430 n.6 (1963).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 27 The technical determinations that are made by
the FCC are illustrated in the complicated regulations
promulgated by that agency, and the technical decisions
published in the FCC Reports, now in its second series.
An example of the question of frequency assignment and

the multiple use of the frequency bands in harmony
discussed in the testimony in the trial court over
appellant's objections, is contained in a lengthy
technical order, In Re Frequency Bands Land Mobile
Service, 51 F.C.C.2d 945 (1975), and cited in
National Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Comm. v. FCC,
525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. den., 425 U.S. 992
(1976).

In National Assoc. the Court of Appeals for

the D.C. Circuit, held that the determinations as to the
extent of the allocation of frequency spectrum to the
development of a nationwide, broadband cellular mobile
radio communications system are the sort that Congress
intended to leave to the broad discretion of the FCC
by imposing a broad public convenience, interest, or
necessity standard.
The trial court stepped beyond its authority in
substituting its judgment as to the alternatives and
necessities available to appellant, as that decision is
exclusively the domain of the FCC or the Utah Public
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- 28 Service commission.

The use is clearly a public use.

The necessity of the use has already been determined
by the Utah Public Service commission.

The necessity

of the particular site has been determined by
appellant through a process of careful analysis
and study.

Appellant has not acted in bad faith or

in an oppressive manner.

Appellant is not taking

anything from intervenor directly, as intervenor has
no ownership in the property in question.
has

suo~:~~e~

Intervenor

.cself to the jursidiction of the FCC

and operates under an FCC permit and license at the
Logan site.

It is the FCC which must determine whether

there is any merit to intervenor's contentions
regarding interference.

Such a determination cannot be

made until appellant secures a site which is suitable
in his opinion for the purposes of his Certificate.
The ruling of the trial court denying the
appellant this particular site should be reversed and the
case remanded with directions to proceed with the
unresolved issues of temporary use and value.

The

need in Logan exists for the service of the appellant
and,in some cases, is a matter of life itself where
physicians require such communications services.
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- 30 Dated this 11th day of December, 1978.

Walter P. Faber, Jr
David Lloyd
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
363-4491

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed three copies each
of the within Brief of Appellant to Mr. B. H. Harris,
attorney for Defendant-Respondent, Harris, Preston &
Gutke, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah

84321, and

Mr. L. Brent Hoggan, attorney for Invervenor-Respondent,
Olson, Hoggan & Sorenson, 56 West Center Street, Logan,
Utah

84321, postage prepaid, this 11th day of

December, 1978.
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